

|  | Page 5 | Page 7 |  |  |
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| 1 | market data, salary pay trend information to | 1 | A. | The commercial industrial organizations are |
| 2 | help the company setting their senior | 2 |  | organization in the private sector across |
| 3 | management compensation from a policy | 3 |  | Canada. This comparative group represents a |
| 4 | perspective. From time to time we are asked | 4 |  | broad talent market that Newfoundland Power |
| 5 | to complete job evaluations upon request if | 5 |  | is competing for executive resources. The |
| 6 | there are any changes in the roles or | 6 |  | comparator group consists of about 390 |
| 7 | responsibility. | 7 |  | organizations. The group size is large and |
| 8 | 'BRIEN: | 8 |  | typically we see it's stable from a |
| 9 | Q. Does Korn Ferry actually set or approve | 9 |  | statistical perspective. The compensation |
| 10 | executive compensation at Newfoundland | 10 |  | policies at Newfoundland Power is targeted |
| 1 | Power? | 11 |  | at a median. This median approach is very |
| 12 | MR. MA: | 12 |  | common in the marketplace. Although the |
| 13 | A. No, we don't. My understanding is th | 13 |  | group has a variety of organizations, |
| 14 | board of directors review our market | 14 |  | particularly the larger employers, we |
| 15 | information in our annual compensation | 15 |  | believe the comparative group is reasonable |
| 16 | letter and also the CEO recommendations of | 16 |  | because the comparisons are made on a point |
| 17 | the VP compensations. The board of | 17 |  | adjusted basis. We do not compare by just |
| 18 | directors will ultimately make the decisions | 18 |  | pure job title, rather we are using the |
| 19 | and approve the executive compensations. | 19 |  | Poor's systems to compare actuals, like |
| 20 | This is a typical process in a marketplace. | 20 |  | scope and responsibilities. |
| 21 | O'BRIEN: | 21 |  | 'BRIEN: |
| 22 | Q. Okay, well | 22 |  | So why didn't you choose a comparator group |
| 23 | your report. Can you describe, generally, | 23 |  | solely comprised of utilities? |
| 24 | the purpose of your report? | 24 |  |  |
| 25 | MR. MA: | 25 | A. | We look at, if you look at utilities solely |
|  | Page 6 |  |  | Page 8 |
| 1 | A. Yes, we can turn to page 3 of the report, | 1 |  | in a private sector, a sample size is too |
| 2 | "Summarized Objectives". There are four | 2 |  | small in Canada. With such a small size, |
| 3 | objectives, basically. Firstly, we compare | 3 |  | the resulting analysis would not be seemed |
| 4 | the executive positions with other executive | 4 |  | reliable. Also a number of utilities in |
| 5 | positions on the basis of content using the | 5 |  | Canada are in a broader public sector with |
| 6 | Hay Point Method. Secondly, we compare the | 6 |  | respect to executive compensations, we do |
| 7 | executive compensations to the comparative | 7 |  | not typically compare public sector and |
| 8 | group consisting of 390 Canadian commercial | 8 |  | private sector companies. Public sector |
| 9 | industrial organizations. When we compare | 9 |  | companies make decisions differently than |
| 10 | Newfoundland Power's compensations, we | 10 |  | those private sector companies as a result |
| 11 | compare to the median of the comparative | 11 |  | of different ownership, funding models and |
| 12 | group; and finally, when we are analyzing | 12 |  | other policy reasons. |
| 13 | compensations, we are analyzing the total | 13 |  | 'BRIEN: |
| 14 | renumerations including salary, short-term | 14 | Q. | Well generally can you speak to the recent |
| 15 | incentive, long-term incentives and | 15 |  | trends and the level of compensations in the |
| 16 | benefits. I think the process is very | 16 |  | comparator group? |
| 17 | consistent with Newfoundland Power's past | 17 |  | A: |
| 18 | practices and the reports previously filed | 18 | A. | Of course. I think it is stated on our |
| 19 | with this Board. | 19 |  | report, page 4, I'm going to go through them |
| 20 | MR. O'BRIEN: | 20 |  | very quickly. Since the pandemic the |
| 21 | Q. Now, Mr. Ma, you mentioned the comparator | 21 |  | overall executive compensation has increased |
| 22 | market being the Canadian commercial | 22 |  | in the comparator group. Since our last |
| 23 | industrial market, why do you choose this | 23 |  | review in the year 2021, salaries have |
| 24 | comparator group? | 24 |  | increased over 10 percent, over three-year |
| 25 | MR. MA: | 25 |  | period. Minor increases in short-term |


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| 1 | incentives and long-term incentive values | 1 |  | using the Hay points. As an example, the |
| 2 | are coming back to the pre-pandemic levels, | 2 |  | CEO at Newfoundland Power would not be |
| 3 | that's the rebound, we call. | 3 |  | directly compared to a CEO of a large |
| 4 | MR. O'BRIEN: | 4 |  | corporation in the comparator group. For |
| 5 | Q. So moving to the specifics of Newfoundland | 5 |  | example, Berrick Gold, instead, we will |
| 6 | Power, can you explain the process you used | 6 |  | benchmark the CEO against the comparator |
| 7 | to evaluate the executive positions? | 7 |  | position of a similar scope and |
| 8 | MR. MA: | 8 |  | responsibility using the Hay points. |
| 9 | A. Of course. Periodically we are engaged by | 9 |  | O'BRIEN: |
| 10 | Newfoundland Power to review Newfoundland | 10 | Q. | Okay, now that we have that background, can |
| 11 | Power executive positions. Using the Korn | 11 |  | you provide us with your view on the |
| 12 | Ferry Hay job evaluation methods, our | 12 |  | methodology Newfoundland Power uses to set |
| 13 | methodology is outlined in Appendix B in my | 13 |  | its executive compensation? |
| 14 | report. Our last review was conducted in | 14 |  |  |
| 15 | June, 2023. We received information from | 15 | A. | Certainly, I think Newfoundland Power uses |
| 16 | Newfoundland Power on the executive profile. | 16 |  | the market median compensation value of the |
| 17 | My colleagues and I had an interview | 17 |  | comparative group for setting its executive |
| 18 | discussion with the CEO, Mr. Murray, for a | 18 |  | compensation policy level. This policy |
| 19 | good understanding of the executive role, | 19 |  | using the market median is very typical in |
| 20 | including their responsibility, challenges | 20 |  | the Canadian marketplace across many |
| 21 | and operating environments. We then assign | 21 |  | industries and sectors. I view this as a |
| 22 | the Hay points to each of these executive | 22 |  | very reasonable approach to setting target |
| 23 | positions through analysis of three core | 23 |  | compensations. According to Newfoundland |
| 24 | factors in our job) evaluation plan, | 24 |  | Power salary policy, the salary ranges are |
| 25 | including know how, problem solving and | 25 |  | set to be plus or minus 15 percent of the |
|  | Page 10 |  |  | Page 12 |
| 1 | accountability. We do not assign Hay points | 1 |  | market median. Most private sector |
| 2 | solely on a title. We consider scope and | 2 |  | organizations would adopt a plus or minus 20 |
| 3 | responsibility of each position. As an | 3 |  | percent of the median or do not have such a |
| 4 | example, the VP of Finance and CFO and VP of | 4 |  | standard at all. In my opinion, |
| 5 | Customer of Operations have the same title | 5 |  | Newfoundland Power targets for salary is |
| 6 | as in our previous review, but the Hay point | 6 |  | narrower than the other private sector |
| 7 | changed as a responsibility of human | 7 |  | companies. Newfoundland Power has |
| 8 | resources function shift. With such a | 8 |  | guidelines for administering actual salaries |
| 9 | change in responsibility, the respective Hay | 9 |  | within the salary range. |
| 10 | point changed while the titles remain | 10 |  | a.m.) |
| 11 | unchanged. The Hay point, as a method of | 11 |  | 'BRIEN: |
| 12 | job evaluations and comparisons has been | 12 | Q. | So let's discuss how Newfoundland Power |
| 13 | useful over 50 years in Canada and is a | 13 |  | compares to the median for its compensation. |
| 14 | highly respected methodology. | 14 |  | How do Newfoundland Power's base salaries |
| 15 | MR. O'BRIEN: | 15 |  | compare to the median? |
| 16 | Q. Can you explain how you used assigned Hay | 16 |  | MA: |
| 17 | points in your analysis? | 17 | A. | The base salary of executives at |
| 18 | MR. MA: | 18 |  | Newfoundland Power are closer to median, |
| 19 | A. Yes, of course. Once we, each position is | 19 |  | within two percent. This is well within the |
| 20 | assigned with the Hay points, we can then | 20 |  | salary range of plus or minus 15 percent. |
| 21 | compare the compensation level of the | 21 |  | Further, I would clarify the analysis |
| 22 | comparator at the same Hay points; therefore | 22 |  | contained in the report is comparing |
| 23 | the size of the comparator organizations, | 23 |  | Newfoundland Power's actual year 2004 |
| 24 | whether they are larger or smaller, is not | 24 |  | salaries to the market data in year 2023. |
| 25 | relevant because the positions are compared | 25 |  | Our estimated market median salary increased |


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| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | for year 2024 was about 3.8 percent based | 1 | compensations at Newfoundland Power is at or |
| 2 | upon our survey. So when we compare | 2 | below median of the comparator group. |
| 3 | Newfoundland Power year 2024 salary to | 3 | R. O'BRIEN: |
| 4 | estimated year 2004 market median, | 4 | Q. Okay, so if we look at the total |
| 5 | Newfoundland Power executive would be | 5 | remuneration of each executive, how does it |
| 6 | further below the median. | 6 | compare to the median? |
| 7 | O'BRIEN: | 7 | MR. MA: |
| 8 | Q. And how did their short-term incentives | 8 | Q. When we are considering salary, short-term |
| 9 | compare to the median? | 9 | incentive, long-term incentive benefits and |
| 10 | R. MA: | 10 | perquisites, Newfoundland Power's total |
| 1 | A. We look at short-term incentive in two ways. | 11 | renumerations is slightly higher than the |
| 12 | Firstly, if it's expressed as a percentage | 12 | market median. Three executives at |
| 13 | of salary, we observe that percentage at | 13 | Newfoundland Power is about median by about |
| 14 | Newfoundland Power is lower than a market | 14 | 5 to 6 percent. One executive position is |
| 15 | median. Secondly, the methods is comparing | 15 | 11 percent below the median. We can bring |
| 16 | salary plus short-term incentive targets | 16 | up Table 2 on page 9 to see the results. I |
| 17 | together. Using this approach, all four | 17 | just spoke about that on the very last |
| 18 | executives at Newfoundland Power are below | 18 | column on the table. |
| 19 | market median. On average, the Newfoundland | 19 | R. O'BRIEN: |
| 20 | executives are actually 7 percent below the | 20 | Q. And does this analysis change if you |
| 21 | market median as a group. | 21 | consider what we call regulated compensation |
| 22 | MR. O'BRIEN: | 22 | or the amount of compensation that's borne |
| 23 | Q. Okay, well | 23 | by ratepayers? |
| 24 | incentives, can you describe what's included | 24 | R. MA: |
| 25 | in that category? | 25 | A. Yes, the conclusion changes. If we can go |
|  | Page 14 |  | Page 16 |
| 1 | MR MA: | 1 | to the page 10, Table 3 , it shows the |
| 2 | A. The long-term incentives can be delivered | 2 | compensations for each executive excluding |
| 3 | different mechanisms or plans in the | 3 | the known regulated portions of their |
| 4 | marketplace. These plans, for example, are | 4 | compensations. A portion of the short-term |
| 5 | called deferred compensations, performance | 5 | incentive is not regulated and all long-term |
| 6 | share units, stock options or cash long-term | 6 | incentive is non-regulated. These costs are |
| 7 | incentives. Long-term incentive at | 7 | borne by the shareholders. Once we remove |
| 8 | Newfoundland Power is not recovered | 8 | this cost, the executives at Newfoundland |
| 9 | customer rates. | 9 | Power are well below the market median. The |
| 10 | MR. O'BRIEN: | 10 | CEO is 33 percent below median. VP and CFO |
| 11 | Q. Well how does Newfoundland Power compare to | 11 | is 18 percent below, VP Energy Supply is 17 |
| 12 | the median for the long-term incentives? | 12 | percent below while the VP Customer |
| 13 | MR. MA: | 13 | Operations is 30 percent below. |
| 14 | A. If we compare Newfoundland Power with the | 14 | R. O'BRIEN: |
| 15 | companies that provide long-term incentives, | 15 | Q. And what does this mean for electricity |
| 16 | all four executives at Newfoundland Power's | 16 | ratepayers? |
| 17 | are below market median for long-term | 17 | MR. MA: |
| 18 | incentives, significantly below median for | 18 | A. This means the cost actually borne by a |
| 19 | the vice presidents. | 19 | ratepayer is much lesser than the market |
| 20 | MR. O'BRIEN: | 20 | median for equivalent positions. Currently, |
| 21 | Q. And how does this impact total direct | 21 | regulated cost are around the 35 th percentile |
| 22 | compensation? | 22 | for the executive group. |
| 23 | MR. MA: | 23 | MR. O'BRIEN: |
| 24 | A. Overall when we consider salaries, short- | 24 | Q. As a final question, Mr. Ma, is it your |
| 25 | term and long-term incentives, total direct | 25 | opinion that Newfoundland Power's policy for |


| executive compensation is reasonable? Page 17 |  |  | Page 19 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | BROWNE, KC: |
| 2 | MR. MA: | 2 | Q. And do you have any offices in Quebec? |
| 3 | A. Yes, it is. As I mentioned earlier, the | 3 | MR. MA: |
| 4 | process used by Newfoundland Power to | 4 | A. Yes, we do. We have an office in Montreal. |
| 5 | compare its executive compensation against | 5 | BROWNE, KC: |
| 6 | jobs with similar job size in a Canadian | 6 | Q. And in Atlantic Canada, your knowledge of |
| 7 | commercial industrial market is reasonable. | 7 | Atlantic Canada comes from what, therefore, |
| 8 | The use of median as a basis for policy | 8 | you have no offices here? |
| 9 | setting is also reasonable as this is a very | 9 | MR. MA: |
| 10 | typical Canadian market practice across | 10 | A. Yes, we acknowledge that we do not have |
| 11 | various sectors. | 11 | offices in Atlantic Canada. During Hay |
| 12 | MR. O'BRIEN: | 12 | Group time, meaning probably about, you |
|  | Q. Thank you, Mr. Ma. Those are all my | 13 | know, five years ago, we used to have an |
| 14 | questions, Mr. Chair. | 14 | office in Halifax, Nova Scotia. After the |
| 15 | MR. CHAIR: | 15 | acquisitions, we kind of closed that office |
|  | Q. Thank you, Mr. O'Brien. So we're over to | 16 | down. |
| 17 | the Consumer Advocate, Mr. Browne. | 17 | BROWNE, KC: |
|  | MR. WICLIF MA, CROSS-EXAMINATION BY DENIS BROWNE, KC | 18 | Q. In terms of Newfoundland Power, Newfoundland |
|  | BROWNE, KC: | 19 | Power is a regulated company, how does a |
|  | Q. Thank you, Chair. Good morning, Mr. Ma. | 20 | regulated company compare with companies in |
|  | MR. MA: | 21 | the private sector that are not regulated? |
|  | A. Good morning. | 22 | MR. MA: |
|  | BROWNE, KC: | 23 | A. Can you repeat your question again? |
|  | Q. So you're headquartered in Toronto? | 24 | BROWNE, KC: |
| 25 | MR. MA: | 25 | Q. Yes, Newfoundland Power is a regulated |
|  | Page 18 |  | Page 20 |
| 1 | A. For Canada, yes, it is headquartered in | 1 | company, it's regulated by this Board, how |
| 2 | Canada. My firm's global headquarters is in | 2 | does a regulated company, such as |
| 3 | Los Angelas, California. | 3 | Newfoundland Power, compare in the private |
| 4 | BROWNE, KC: | 4 | sector with non-regulated companies? |
| 5 | Q. So you're headquartered in Toronto and you | 5 | MR. MA: |
| 6 | have no other offices in Canada, only in | 6 | A. I think, you know, from that point of view |
| 7 | Toronto? | 7 | many organizations in the private sectors |
| 8 | MR. MA: | 8 | are subject to regulations too. |
| 9 | A. No, we do have offices in other cities, | 9 | Newfoundland Power is regulated in a way |
| 10 | including Vancouver, Calgary, Ottawa and | 10 | because of the industry requirements, both |
| 11 | Toronto. | 11 | types of organizations are still aiming to |
| 12 | BROWNE, KC: | 12 | produce and deliver good customer service, |
| 13 | Q. And in a typical office, how many employees | 13 | efficiency and to a certain extent, cost |
| 14 | would there be, like for instance in your | 14 | managements. |
| 15 | office in Toronto? | 15 | BROWNE, KC: |
| 16 | MR. MA: | 16 | Q. Many, okay, sorry, go ahead. |
| 17 | A. In our Toronto office, give and take, we | 17 | MR. MA: |
| 18 | have approximately 150 to 170 employees. In | 18 | A. Okay. Private sector organizations do have |
| 19 | other offices I do not have the statistics, | 19 | all those characteristics too. |
| 20 | but my Vancouver office is one of the | 20 | BROWNE, KC: |
| 21 | largest one, after Toronto office. | 21 | Q. Private sector companies are answerable or |
| 22 | BROWNE, KC: | 22 | accountable to their shareholders for the |
| 23 | Q. And you have no offices in Atlantic Canada? | 23 | most part, is that not correct? |
| 24 | MR. MA: | 24 | MR. MA: |
| 25 | A. We do not. | 25 | A. Ultimately answering to the owners, |


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| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | basically. | 1 | mentioned that you've met with the |  |
| 2 | BROWNE, KC: | 2 |  | president. How often do you meet with the |
| 3 | Q. Who is Newfoundland Power accountable to | 3 |  | president or an executive of Newfoundland |
| 4 | comparatively? | 4 |  | Power? |
| 5 | MR. MA: | 5 |  |  |
| 6 | A. I believe that it is answering to the owner, | 6 | A. | Most of my engagements is going through the |
| 7 | meaning the Fortis Inc. through its board of | 7 |  | VP Finance and CFO because she is |
| 8 | directors of Newfoundland Power. | 8 |  | accountable for the HR functions. I met |
| 9 | BROWNE, KC: | 9 |  | with the CEO upon request when there is a |
| 10 | Q. So the shareholders of Fortis indirectly, I | 10 |  | need only. We did not meet often during the |
| 11 | guess, are the group who would be accounting | 11 |  | years. |
| 12 | for Newfoundland Power, is that a way to | 12 |  | NE, KC: |
| 13 | explain that? | 13 |  | Now you filed a report on compensation to |
| 14 | MR. MA: | 14 |  | Newfoundland Power which ultimately goes to |
| 15 | A. I think, you know, your logics is logical in | 15 |  | the board of directors, I assume. How often |
| 16 | terms of ultimate ownership. | 16 |  | do you do that? |
| 17 | BROWNE, KC: | 17 |  | U: |
| 18 | Q. Okay, thank you. How many other Fortis | 18 | A. | On an annual basis we provide Newfoundland |
| 19 | companies does your company act for in | 19 |  | Power management the salary letter which |
| 20 | Canada? | 20 |  | includes the salary projected level and in |
| 21 | MR. MA: | 21 |  | turn, the management will share that letter |
| 22 | A. The majority of them. We have advised | 22 |  | with the board of directors for positions |
| 23 | Fortis BC, Fortis Ontario, Fortis Alberta, | 23 |  | and approval of executive compensations. |
| 24 | Maritime Electric, et cetera. | 24 |  | NE, KC: |
| 25 | BROWNE, KC: | 25 | Q. | So you do that annually? |
|  | Page 22 |  |  | Page 24 |
| 1 | Q. And what about in the United States? | 1 |  |  |
| 2 | MR. MA: | 2 |  | That's right. |
| 3 | A. We do not advise Fortis subsidiaries in the | 3 |  | NNE, KC: |
| 4 | United States directly. | 4 | Q. | And do you get a report back on the result |
| 5 | BROWNE, KC.: | 5 |  | of your recommendations? Are there |
| 6 | Q. You say directly, what does that mean? | 6 |  | recommendations made in this report? |
| 7 | MR. MA: | 7 |  | A: |
| 8 | A. From time to time we provide Fortis Inc. | 8 | A. | No, we don't. After our publications of the |
| 9 | with information about US market practices, | 9 |  | salary letter, the resulted actions taken by |
| 10 | but we do not advise the subsidiary of | 10 |  | the board are not communicated back to my |
| 11 | Fortis United States subsidiaries directly. | 11 |  | firm or myself. |
| 12 | BROWNE, KC: | 12 |  | NE, KC: |
| 13 | Q. And what about Fortis, the company, the | 13 | Q. | But you must see them eventually because you |
| 14 | holding company, Fortis, are they a client | 14 |  | do report annually and you need to know your |
| 15 | of yours? | 15 |  | starting point so you would know what you |
| 16 | MR. MA: | 16 |  | reported the previous time. |
| 17 | A. We support them on job evaluations, their | 17 |  | A: |
| 18 | compensation consultants is a different | 18 | A. | That is approximately about 11 months later |
| 19 | organization, not contrary. | 19 |  | when I am preparing the following, you know, |
| 20 | BROWNE, KC: | 20 |  | salary letter for Newfoundland Power, that's |
| 21 | Q. So you advise them in some matters? | 21 |  | the time that I receive the adjusted salary |
| 22 | MR. MA: | 22 |  | after about 11 months later. |
| 23 | A. In some matters, yes, we do. | 23 |  | a.m.) |
| 24 | BROWNE, KC: | 24 |  | NNE, KC: |
| 25 | Q. And in terms of Newfoundland Power, you | 25 | Q. | So you're able to see from your |


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| 1 | recommendation what the result was | 1 |  | downward salary. The up and downs is |
| 2 | indirectly that way? | 2 |  | usually caused by the incentive program |
| 3 | MR. MA: | 3 |  | which is the short-term incentive and the |
| 4 | A. That's right, but not immediately. | 4 |  | long-term incentives. |
| 5 | BROWNE, KC: | 5 |  | NNE, KC: |
| 6 | Q. And, you make a recommendation annually to | 6 |  | But salaries in Canada can remain stationary |
| 7 | the board of directors of Newfoundland Power | 7 |  | from time to time? |
| 8 | concerning the executive compensation, that | 8 |  |  |
| 9 | is your evidence? | 9 |  | Yes, but what I tried to say here is the |
| 10 | MR. MA: | 10 |  | volatility of salary is narrower. |
| 11 | A. I have to clarify that my firm and I do not | 11 |  | NE, KC: |
| 12 | make recommendations to the board of | 12 |  | In your report to the directors of |
| 13 | directors. We only provide market | 13 |  | Newfoundland Power, do you consider the |
| 14 | intelligence and data. | 14 |  | other Fortis companies in Canada that you're |
| 15 | BROWNE, KC: | 15 |  | also advising or informing on to their |
| 16 | Q. The board of directors could very well | 16 |  | respective board of directors? Do you |
| 17 | consider those recommendations, could they | 17 |  | consider that factor? |
| 18 | not? | 18 |  | AA: |
| 19 | MR. MA: | 19 |  | Can you repeat your question again? |
| 20 | A. I cannot assume that is the case. | 20 |  | NNE, KC: |
| 21 | BROWNE, KC: | 21 | Q | Sure. Your evidence was that you also do |
| 22 | Q. In terms of your reporting to the board of | 22 |  | work for the other Fortis companies in |
| 23 | directors, is there trending? Each year do | 23 |  | Canada, so when you're reporting to the |
| 24 | you report information which could | 24 |  | board of directors of Newfoundland Power, do |
| 25 | ultimately see an increase or a decrease in | 25 |  | you consider what you have reported to the |
|  | Page 26 |  |  | Page 28 |
| 1 | compensation? | 1 |  | other Fortis companies? |
| 2 | MR. MA: | 2 |  | A: |
| 3 | A. Yeah, there are trends in the marketplace. | 3 | A. | We don't. Basically we treat every case in |
| 4 | I would probably think it, communicate to | 4 |  | isolation without any kind of deliberate |
| 5 | the board here in general, there are up and | 5 |  | connections between the companies. We |
| 6 | downs, more ups than downs. | 6 |  | respect the privacy of each individual |
| 7 | BROWNE, KC: | 7 |  | company. When we are formulating the |
| 8 | Q. Sure, more ups than downs. | 8 |  | comparative group, for example we do not |
| 9 | MR. MA: | 9 |  | include any of the Fortis companies in the |
| 10 | A. That's righ | 10 |  | comparative group to formulate the market |
| 11 | BROWNE, KC: | 11 |  | analysis for Newfoundland Power. |
| 12 | Q. If you gave a load of downs, would that | 12 |  | NNE, KC: |
| 13 | affect your relationship, perhaps, with the | 13 | Q. | Are there different personnel you employ |
| 14 | - | 14 |  | within your company to ensure such a |
| 15 | MR. MA: | 15 |  | separation of information or are the same |
| 16 | A. I don't think that is the issue, we do not | 16 |  | people doing the recommendations to |
| 17 | consider the relationship will affect our | 17 |  | Newfoundland Power who will be doing the |
| 18 | market analysis. Market analysis is factual | 18 |  | recommendations for the other Fortis |
| 19 | based upon our database evidence. The | 19 |  | companies in Canada? |
| 20 | market up and downs is a reflection of the | 20 |  | A: |
| 21 | economic conditions and also the market | 21 | A. | We basically would not directly talk to our |
| 22 | mechanisms. Salary usually would not be | 22 |  | colleagues who handle other Fortis |
| 23 | going down because in Canada, salary | 23 |  | subsidiaries in Canada, but however from a |
| 24 | reductions is causing constructive | 24 |  | database perspective, where possible we will |
| 25 | dismissals, so nobody will be adjusting | 25 |  | maintain the consistencies of our findings |


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| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | 1 | Q. So some people who are doing work for |  |
| 2 | BROWNE, KC: | 2 | Maritime Electric are also doing work for |  |
| 3 | Q. Okay, what does that mean in reference to | 3 | Newfoundland Power? |  |
| 4 | the Fortis companies, you would maintain | 4 | MR. MA: |  |
| 5 | consistency? | 5 | A. | That's right. |
| 6 | MR. MA: | 6 | BROWNE, KC: |  |
| 7 | A. From a market data perspective, let's give | 7 | Q. | And these same people, would they be doing |
| 8 | you an example, Fortis BC according to the | 8 |  | similar work for Fortis BC? |
| 9 | information form, they also use a similar | 9 | MR. MA: |  |
| 10 | group like Newfoundland Power. We will make | 10 | A. | Different people, I wouldn't call it similar |
| 11 | sure that the data provided to both | 11 |  | people. |
| 12 | organizations will not be 180 degrees | 12 | BROWNE, KC: |  |
| 13 | different, you know, the conclusion should | 13 | Q. Okay. |  |
| 14 | be very similar assuming all other factors | 14 | MR. MA: |  |
| 15 | are equal. | 15 | A. | One thing that I can say to the board here, |
| 16 | BROWNE, KC: | 16 |  | I would not share anything with Maritime |
| 17 | Q. So in terms of another Fortis company, give | 17 | A. | Electric about what I do with Newfoundland |
| 18 | me one that you're also doing in Canada? | 18 | Power, vice versa.NE, KC: |  |
| 19 | Fortis BC? | 19 |  |  |
| 20 | MR. MA: | 20 | Q. | Do you send a copy of your report to Fortis, |
| 21 | A. Fortis BC, Maritime Electric. | 21 |  | the holding company? |
| 22 | BROWNE, KC: | 22 | MR. MA: |  |
| 23 | Okay, so in reference to Fortis BC, when a report is made to the board of directors of Fortis BC, are the same people compiling the | $\begin{aligned} & 23 \\ & 24 \end{aligned}$ |  | No, I don't. You mean Newfoundland Power review the report? |
| 25 |  | 25 | BROWNE, KC: |  |
|  | Page 30 |  |  | Page 32 |
| 1 | report, who compiled the report for | 1 | Q | The report only goes to Newfoundland Power, |
| 2 | Newfoundland Power or Maritime Electric? | 2 |  | but you don't know what they do with it. |
| 3 | MR. MA: | 3 | MR. MA: |  |
| 4 | A. I do not know a hundred percent because it | 4 | A. | That's right. I know what they do with it, |
| 5 | was handled by my colleagues. We do not, | 5 |  | they share it with their board of directors. |
| 6 | you know, talk with each other about the | 6 | BROWNE, KC: |  |
| 7 | governance process of each individual Fortis | 7 | Q. Do they share it with Fortis, the holding company or do you know? |  |
| 8 | company. | 8 |  |  |
| 9 | BROWNE, KC: | 9 | MR. MA: |  |
| 10 | Q. So within your own company you have | 10 | A. I do not know. <br> BROWNE, KC: |  |
| 11 | separation there to ensure, is that what | 11 |  |  |
| 12 | you're telling us, is that what you're | 12 | Q. | You state you do the other Fortis companies |
| 13 | telling this Board, that Newfoundland Power | 13 |  | in Canada, how does Newfoundland Power rank |
| 14 | is handled by a separate group within your | 14 |  | in characteristics with, for instance, |
| 15 | company which will be distinct from those | 15 |  | Maritime Electric? How do you compare those |
| 16 | people doing the work for Fortis BC or | 16 |  | companies? |
| 17 | Maritime Electric, that there's no crossover | 17 | MR. MA: |  |
| 18 | of personnel, is that what you're telling | 18 | A. | I think in general probably Maritime |
| 19 | the Board? | 19 |  | Electric and Newfoundland Power are similar, |
| 20 | MR. MA: | 20 |  | but probably Maritime Electric will be still |
| 21 | A. Certain organizations that are handled by | 21 |  | slightly smaller, but not by much. |
| 22 | different consultants, I admit that I also | 22 | BROWNE, KC: |  |
| 23 | do work for Maritime Electric in Atlantic | 23 | Q. | Is the size of the company and the |
| 24 | Canada in Prince Edward Island. | 24 |  | ratepayers that they serve, is that a |
| 25 | BROWNE, KC: | 25 |  | characteristic which you look at in doing |




|  | Page 41 |  | Page 43 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | BROWNE, KC: | 1 | BROWNE, KC: |
| 2 | Q. But you didn't see fit to put that in your | 2 | Q. So, because you have no cohort from |
| 3 | answer that they were - | 3 | Newfoundland and Labrador itself, you're |
| 4 | MR. MA: | 4 | making recommendations to a Board of |
| 5 | A. Because we are using the headquarter was the | 5 | Directors without that cohort, how do you |
| 6 | - | 6 | know for certain that the recommendations |
| 7 | BROWNE, KC: | 7 | you're making for Newfoundland Power's |
| 8 | Q. Headquarters was in Toronto. | 8 | executive are well beyond what any other |
| 9 | MR. MA: | 9 | company in this province would pay? How |
| 10 | A. Yeah, that's right. | 10 | would you know if that's a fact or not? |
| 11 | BROWNE, KC: | 11 | MR. MA: |
| 12 | Q. And in Atlantic Canada you have three | 12 | A. We do not know, because we did not have the |
| 13 | organizations, a brewery and Maritime Canada | 13 | imperative data to validate your statement. |
| 14 | Limited, Kongsberg, what are they? What | 14 | BROWNE, KC: |
| 15 | kind of an organization are they? | 15 | Q. And there's no other check that you do |
| 16 | MR. MA: | 16 | before making your recommendation, even |
| 17 | A. I believe that, you know, those are the | 17 | though your recommendation is based on quite |
| 18 | industrial organizations. They are in | 18 | a sample of companies, most of which have no |
| 19 | manufacturing. I do not have any contacts | 19 | connection with Newfoundland Power or - |
| 20 | or particular knowledge of each individual | 20 | Newfoundland Power has what, assets of less |
| 21 | organization. | 21 | than two billion dollars. So, certainly |
| 22 | BROWNE, KC: | 22 | would not compare with Delta Airlines. |
| 23 | Q. So, you're making recommendations to the | 23 | MR. MA: |
| 24 | Board of Directors in this jurisdiction | 24 | A. I have to remind the Board that our |
| 25 | using the list of participants in Appendix C | 25 | evaluations of the positions is not based |
|  | Page 42 |  | Page 44 |
| 1 | and therefore, you're - you have Delta | 1 | upon asset size or just revenues. We are |
| 2 | Airlines here. What would Delta Airlines | 2 | using the Hay point methods and that has |
| 3 | have in common with Newfoundland Power? | 3 | taken, you know, the differences in terms of |
| 4 | MR. MA: | 4 | the size. |
| 5 | A. It's not about Delta Airline. We are | 5 | BROWNE, KC: |
| 6 | talking about a whole comparator group. | 6 | Q. I represent ratepayers here. |
| 7 | It's a diverse comparator group. We did not | 7 | MR. MA: |
| 8 | deliberately pick, cherry pick, the high | 8 | A. Um-hm. |
| 9 | payor or the low payor as a cross-comparator | 9 | BROWNE, KC: |
| 10 | group. It is a representation of executive | 10 | Q. So, these salaries, the compensation that's |
| 11 | talent. I think the Board, you know, we all | 11 | due to executives of Newfoundland Power, can |
| 12 | have to understand that Newfoundland Power | 12 | be known and I put it to you that ratepayers |
| 13 | executives is not just engineering jobs. | 13 | in this province - and you're familiar with |
| 14 | Although those are very important jobs, | 14 | our economy here, are you not? |
| 15 | engineering in the executive, we have other | 15 | MR. MA: |
| 16 | kind of corporate services jobs, like head | 16 | A. I do not know how to answer your questions |
| 17 | of HR, CFO and other organizations, not | 17 | in terms of familiarities. I only can read |
| 18 | necessarily, you know, Atlantic Canada | 18 | it on a newspaper. |
| 19 | organizations, would be the recruitment | 19 | BROWNE, KC: |
| 20 | ground or talent ground for Newfoundland | 20 | Q. Yeah. So, you read things in the newspaper, |
| 21 | Power. So, you know, after a lot of | 21 | so you know the economy in Newfoundland and |
| 22 | deliberation and discussions, we believe the | 22 | Labrador is not the same as the economy in |
| 23 | broad markets will be the appropriate market | 23 | Ontario or British Columbia. Is that |
| 24 | for the talent supply and demand factor as | 24 | correct? |
| 25 | far as Newfoundland Power is concerned. | 25 | MR. MA: |


|  | Page 45 | Page 47 |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | A. Yes, yeah, that's correct, and every | 1 |  | going to be considering benefits, |
| 2 | province is in different conditions, have | 2 |  | perquisites, added to the target total |
| 3 | different challenges. | 3 |  | direct, the median value is approximate is |
| 4 | BROWNE, KC: | 4 |  | 1.3 million. So, that is my explanations of |
| 5 | Q. So, you're setting compensation, you're | 5 |  | the numbers. |
| 6 | recommending, you're providing a report - | 6 |  | a.m.) |
| 7 | and you don't like to use the word | 7 |  | NNE, KC: |
| 8 | "recommendation". You're providing a | 8 | Q. | You refer to it as the target total. What |
| 9 | report to the Board of Directors of | 9 |  | does target mean? The target total means |
| 10 | Newfoundland Power without any knowledge of | 10 |  | what? |
| 11 | how the Board of Directors will take that | 11 |  | MA: |
| 12 | information and apply it in this provincial | 12 | A. | The target it means is for incentive, it is |
| 13 | jurisdiction. Is that correct? | 13 |  | at the target performance levels. It is not |
| 14 | MR. MA: | 14 |  | the maximum payout level nor the threshold |
| 15 | A. My mandate is not to take into account the | 15 |  | payout level. To put it in a very common |
| 16 | economic conditions in my analysis, you | 16 |  | language, the target payout level usually it |
| 17 | know, for pay purpose. That's not my | 17 |  | means is a target performance level. Give |
| 18 | mandate. | 18 |  | you an example, I have a budget of \$20 |
| 19 | BROWNE, KC: | 19 |  | million in terms of earnings. That is my |
| 20 | Q. In your report, you provide information to | 20 |  | budget. That is my target earnings levels |
| 21 | the Board of Directors and in the report in | 21 |  | for the year. If I make it, I will payout |
| 22 | Table 2 on page 9 of your report, if we can | 22 |  | at the target payout at 50 percent of |
| 23 | put that up, you see here the total | 23 |  | salary, something like that. |
| 24 | remuneration, all compensation elements, and | 24 |  | NNE, KC: |
| 25 | can you just take us through this? So, the | 25 | Q. | So, you're saying the target total here of |
|  | Page 46 |  |  | Page 48 |
| 1 | president and CEO, what is the total - you | 1 |  | 1,300,000 for the president and CEO, it |
| 2 | refer to it as the target total direct | 2 |  | could be more than that or it could be less |
| 3 | compensation. What would that be for the | 3 |  | than that? |
| 4 | president here using what you call a P-50? | 4 |  |  |
| 5 | What would the total remuneration be or the | 5 | A. | That's a true statement, in actual delivery, |
| 6 | total target be? | 6 |  | depending on the performance outcome. |
| 7 | MR. MA: | 7 |  | NE, KC: |
| 8 | A. Okay. So, I'm going to use the president as | 8 |  | So, in what range higher could it be? |
| 9 | an example to explain the numbers for the | 9 |  |  |
| 10 | audience. Base salary P-50 in the | 10 | A. | It depends on the year, and I cannot have a |
| 11 | marketplace, in the comparator group, is | 11 |  | forecast of each of the years. You know, |
| 12 | 501,501 in 100,000. When we are going to | 12 |  | every company is different in terms of that |
| 13 | the right, target total cash, it means | 13 |  | random outcome. |
| 14 | salary plus target short-term incentive is | 14 |  | NE, KC: |
| 15 | equals to $809,809,000$ at the median level. | 15 | Q. | And the salary, the actual base salary, will |
| 16 | The long-term incentive column is reported | 16 |  | be paid for by the ratepayers of the |
| 17 | amongst those who use long-term incentive | 17 |  | province? |
| 18 | only, the median of all those long-term | 18 |  |  |
| 19 | incentives provided, the median value is | 19 |  | In your case, I assume that is the right |
| 20 | 461. The total direct compensations, it | 20 |  | answer. |
| 21 | means salary, short-term incentive targets | 21 |  | NE, KC: |
| 22 | plus long-term incentives, whether the | 22 | Q. | And there are other amounts here. Would any |
| 23 | market is providing long-term incentive or | 23 |  | of these be paid for by Fortis, for example? |
| 24 | not, the total value for the total direct | 24 |  |  |
| 25 | compensations is 1.18 million. If we're | 25 | A. | I think in the analysis in Table 3, we |


|  | Page 49 |  | Page 51 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | illustrated that, in terms of answer to your | 1 | industry in Newfoundland and Labrador, how |
| 2 | questions. A portion of the short-term | 2 | do know that? |
| 3 | incentives is paid by the shareholders. I | 3 | MR. MA: |
| 4 | think part of the payout for the earnings | 4 | A. We have not done that analysis, so I cannot |
| 5 | component is paid by the shareholders. So, | 5 | answer your question. |
| 6 | that's a reduction there. Long-term | 6 | BROWNE, KC: |
| 7 | incentives is created and adopted primarily | 7 | Q. Going to ask you - and you go to page 3 of |
| 8 | to align, you know, for the shareholders' | 8 | your report. You say in the first bullet, |
| 9 | interests. It is paid by the shareholders. | 9 | below the line, "the following are the |
| 10 | There's a reduction there. So then, you | 10 | review objectives" and bullet, "comparing |
| 11 | know, 1.356 million is the original total | 11 | Newfoundland Power, NFP, executive positions |
| 12 | renumerations number, but after the | 12 | with other executive positions in the |
| 13 | deductions of the non-regulated factors, | 13 | comparative market on the basis of similar |
| 14 | Newfoundland Power adjusted total | 14 | job content, evaluation point, this method |
| 15 | renumeration at target level is only 873 | 15 | is considered with Newfoundland Power's |
| 16 | million - sorry, thousand, 873,000 . | 16 | historical executive compensation |
| 17 | BROWNE, KC: | 17 | principles". How do you know that? Who |
| 18 | Q. And how does this compensation package, the | 18 | sets Newfoundland Power's historical |
| 19 | total remuneration, all compensation | 19 | executive compensation principles and what |
| 20 | elements, compare with Maritime Electric, | 20 | are they? |
| 21 | for example, the president there? | 21 | MR. MA: |
| 22 | MR. MA: | 22 | A. We have done similar reports in the previous |
| 23 | A. I cannot answer that question. It is client | 23 | years for Newfoundland Power using the Hay |
| 24 | privileged, confidential information about | 24 | point methods and that has been adopted by |
| 25 | Maritime Electric. | 25 | the Board of Directors for many years, but I |
|  | Page 50 |  | Page 52 |
| 1 | BROWNE, KC: | 1 | cannot recall the precise date and year |
| 2 | Q. And what about Nova Scotia, Nova Scotia | 2 | because I wasn't involved in the previous |
| 3 | Power, Emera? | 3 | studies. Based upon our records, there has |
| 4 | MR. MA: | 4 | been a historic practice being accepted and |
| 5 | A. I cannot answer that question, even though | 5 | adopted by the Board of Directors. We are |
| 6 | it is disclosed in the proxy, but I do not | 6 | just referencing the method is consistent |
| 7 | remember that. But based upon my vague | 7 | with the history. |
| 8 | memory, Nova Scotia Power numbers will | 8 | BROWNE, KC: |
| 9 | probably be higher than this because it's a | 9 | Q. And you say a comparator market on the basis |
| 10 | much bigger organization. | 10 | of similar job content. How is similar job |
| 11 | BROWNE, KC: | 11 | content determined? |
| 12 | Q. Sure. So, the size of the organization | 12 | MR. MA: |
| 13 | matters? | 13 | A. We use the method called job evaluations. |
| 14 | MR. MA: | 14 | They are called Korn Ferry Hay job |
| 15 | A. Size and complexity. | 15 | evaluation methods. The plan primarily |
| 16 | BROWNE, KC: | 16 | consists of three core factors, the knowhow, |
| 17 | Q. So, how do you know or do you, if the | 17 | problem solving and accountability. This |
| 18 | president and CEO or the vice-president | 18 | method has been used by hundred thousand of |
| 19 | finance or the vice-president of engineering | 19 | organizations around the world. Many |
| 20 | or the vice-president of customer operations | 20 | organizations in Atlantic Canada use these |
| 21 | that what they are getting on compensation | 21 | methods too. |
| 22 | in this jurisdiction, in Newfoundland and | 22 | BROWNE, KC: |
| 23 | Labrador, compares with the private | 23 | Q. Is geography a determinant in the |
| 24 | industry, private companies? This is a | 24 | comparative market? |
| 25 | regulated company. Compared with private | 25 | MR. MA: |



|  | Page 57 |  | Page 59 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | that factor be considered? Because you're | 1 |  | Might be some exceptions, but generally. |
| 2 | using companies in your group that are in | 2 |  |  |
| 3 | the City of Toronto where a two-storey house | 3 | A. | Yeah, I think I will congratulate |
| 4 | would cost maybe millions whereas here, you | 4 |  | Newfoundland Power has been doing a very |
| 5 | might get one for 400,000 . How is that | 5 |  | good job in succession planning. It's a |
| 6 | differentiation dealt with in your report? | 6 |  | chicken and egg issue. Why is that? |
| 7 | (10:15 a.m.) | 7 |  | Because of the good executive compensation |
| 8 | MR. MA: | 8 |  | program is attractive here, being able to |
| 9 | A. I don't think in our report deliberately | 9 |  | support the succession planning. So, the |
| 10 | wants to assess the correlations between the | 10 |  | executive would stay within the company |
| 11 | housing price between cities to formulate a | 11 |  | rather than going outside. So, it is a |
| 12 | compensation markets. In my own opinion, | 12 |  | matter of risk management. |
| 13 | when you are relocating executive or | 13 |  | NE, KC: |
| 14 | attracting executives, and I have seen that | 14 |  | And I guess another factor could be that |
| 15 | in many cases, executive only is a national | 15 |  | maybe they're overcompensated here and |
| 16 | market, peoples are mobile. I have seen | 16 |  | realize the same. |
| 17 | cases that Newfoundland Power executive are | 17 |  |  |
| 18 | being attracted to western Canada. | 18 |  | I do not know how to answer that question. |
| 19 | BROWNE, KC: | 19 |  | NE, KC: |
| 20 | Q. Recently? | 20 |  | Yes. |
| 21 | MR. MA: | 21 | MR |  |
| 22 | A. Recently. | 22 |  | Because there's no relativity. |
| 23 | BROWNE, KC: | 23 |  | NE, KC: |
| $\begin{aligned} & 24 \\ & 25 \end{aligned}$ | Q. And to what company would they be attracted to in western Canada? | $\begin{aligned} & 24 \\ & 25 \end{aligned}$ | Q. | We don't know. Now, there's another utility here, a publicly owned utility, Newfoundland |
|  | Page 58 |  |  | Page 60 |
| 1 | MR. MA: | 1 |  | and Labrador Hydro. Have you looked at |
| 2 | A. It is another industrial company; is in our | 2 |  | their compensation packages in preparing |
| 3 | comparator group, but I cannot name the | 3 |  | your report to the executive to the Board of |
| 4 | company because of confidentiality. | 4 |  | Directors of Newfoundland Power? |
| 5 | BROWNE, KC: | 5 |  |  |
| 6 | Q. Would it be another Fortis company? | 6 | A. | No, I did not. Even though if I did, I |
| 7 | MR. MA: | 7 |  | wouldn't be saying too much because that |
| 8 | A. No. | 8 |  | particular company is also a client of Korn |
| 9 | BROWNE, KC: | 9 |  | Ferry. We have obligations on protecting |
| 10 | Q. And because there's evidence here at this | 10 |  | confidentiality. |
| 11 | hearing that the current executive are | 11 |  | NE, KC: |
| 12 | pretty well homegrown and bred and haven't | 12 | Q. | Reference to Fortis. Fortis is a |
| 13 | travelled that far from a corporate | 13 |  | participant in the compensation package. Is |
| 14 | transitioning. | 14 |  | that correct? |
| 15 | MR. MA: | 15 |  |  |
| 16 | A. Um-hm. | 16 | A. | No. The Fortis companies are excluded in |
| 17 | BROWNE, KC: | 17 |  | the comparator group. |
| 18 | Q. So, is that a factor that should be taken | 18 |  | NE, KC: |
| 19 | into account in setting compensation, the | 19 | Q. | Yeah, but Fortis is a participant in the |
| 20 | fact that they're local, homegrown, went to | 20 |  | compensation in that the executive are the |
| 21 | university here, et cetera, et cetera, | 21 |  | recipients of Fortis shares. Is that |
| 22 | staying here, got their families, et cetera? | 22 |  | correct? |
| 23 | So, how is that factored into your | 23 |  |  |
| 24 | compensation if you got an executive that | 24 | A. | Newfoundland Power executives are |
| 25 | can be described in those terms generally? | 25 |  | participants of the Fortis Inc. share |




| proprietary. Page 69 |  |  |  | Page 71 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | 1 | including one of my colleagues, who is the |  |
| 2 | MR. MA: | 2 |  | global job evaluations leader in terms of |
| 3 | A. Only for our clients who are having a client | 3 |  | our own standard, in partnership with me, to |
| 4 | and vendor relationships. | 4 |  | interview Mr. Murray to understand the jobs |
| 5 | SIMMONS, KC: | 5 |  | and our team, including myself, will be the |
| 6 | Right, okay. So, would I be correct then in thinking that the ability of Korn Ferry to | 6 |  | contributor to the evaluation process and |
| 7 |  | 7 |  | the results. |
| 8 | put together comparator groups when | 8 |  | ONS, KC: |
| 9 | undertaking a - preparing a report for a | 9 | Q | So, to some extent then, you and the senior |
| 10 | client, that ability is going to be limited | 10 |  | examiner will bring your judgment to bear in |
| 11 | by the information that Korn Ferry has in | 11 |  | determining how many points to assign to |
| 12 | its database, which has been collected from | 12 |  | different categories? |
| 13 | its other customers? | 13 | MR. MA: |  |
| 14 | MR. MA: | 14 | A. | Yes. The judgment is based upon evidence. |
| 15 | A. Yeah, it is limited to our database, you | 15 |  | ONS, KC: |
| 16 | know. That is a correct statement. | 16 | Q. | Right. And then those positions are |
| 17 | SIMMONS, KC: | 17 |  | compared to positions in other companies |
| 18 | Right, okay. And another question for you then about how the comparisons are actually | 18 |  | that are in your database where the number |
| 19 |  | 19 |  | of points are similar? Is that right? |
| 20 | done. I heard you say that how the point | 20 |  | MA: |
| 21 | system works is a longstanding practice, I | 21 | A. | Can you repeat your question again? |
| 22 | guess, inherited from the Hay Group of | 22 |  | ONS, KC: |
| 23 | evaluating the three different aspects of an | 23 | Q. | So, if Mr. Murray's job had 6,000 points, |
| 24 | executive's job and assigning points to them and you total up the number of points and | 24 |  | you go to your database of comparator |
| 25 |  | 25 |  | companies and you look for other positions |
|  | Page 70 |  |  | Page 72 |
| 1 | say CEO job is worth 6,000 points, something | 1 |  | in those companies that also have about |
| 2 | like that. And in Newfoundland Power's | 2 |  | 6,000 points? Is that right? |
| 3 | case, I think, you worked from, correct me | 3 |  |  |
| 4 | if I'm wrong, job descriptions and | 4 | A. | For compensation analysis, yes. |
| 5 | interviews? | 5 |  | ONS, KC: |
| 6 | MR. MA: | 6 |  | Yes. |
| 7 | A. We are provided with job profile | 7 |  |  |
| 8 | information. | 8 | A. | Yes. |
| 9 | SIMMONS, KC: | 9 |  | ONS, KC: |
| 10 | Q. Profile information. | 10 | Q. | Okay. And that's what we're talking about |
| 11 | MR. MA: | 11 |  | here, compensation analysis. |
| 12 | A. It is not the full descriptions of the jobs | 12 |  |  |
| 13 | on every detail. The profile includes all | 13 |  | Right, compensation analysis, yes. |
| 14 | the key dimensional information. It | 14 |  | ONS, KC: |
| 15 | includes all the functional | 15 | Q. | Right. So, in, I don't know, General Motors |
| 16 | responsibilities, you know. It is not like | 16 |  | Canada, it may not be the CEO, it may be |
| 17 | an essay-type of job descriptions. | 17 |  | someone farther down the chain that would |
| 18 | SIMMONS, KC: | 18 |  | have 6,000 points and would the comparative |
| 19 | Q. Okay. And there must be then an analyst in | 19 |  | person. Okay. And then for each of those |
| 20 | your company who takes that information and | 20 |  | companies in the database, were the |
| 21 | makes the determinations about how many | 21 |  | positions reviewed and the points assigned |
| 22 | points to assign to different categories and | 22 |  | in the same way as for Newfoundland Power? |
| 23 | total up the number of points? | 23 |  | a.m.) |
| 24 | MR. MA: | 24 |  |  |
| 25 | A. Yes. It is the senior consultant's job, | 25 | A. | We usually do it with the clients, in terms |



|  | Page 77 |  | Page 79 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | because statistics is - I don't know if | 1 | may limit what use you can make of that |
| 2 | you'd class it as mathematics or a science, | 2 | data. So, you're not publicly disclosing |
| 3 | but it has that kind of rigour to it and a | 3 | here specific other client information. Do |
| 4 | statistician will be able to look at a size | 4 | those sorts of agreements also limit what |
| 5 | of a sample and determine statistically | 5 | use you can make of that data for |
| 6 | assign a percentage of reliability. First, | 6 | constructing comparator groups? |
| 7 | they'll find a threshold as to whether it's | 7 | MR. MA: |
| 8 | large enough to be used at all. Then | 8 | A. No. |
| 9 | they'll assign a percentage of reliability. | 9 | SIMMONS, KC: |
| 10 | Do you do anything like that when you're | 10 | Q. No, okay. |
| 11 | preparing these analysis to state how | 11 | MR. MA: |
| 12 | reliable your market data is? | 12 | A. No. |
| 13 | MR. MA: | 13 | SIMMONS, KC: |
| 14 | A. I don't think we did in a technical sense, | 14 | Q. Okay. I have some questions for you now |
| 15 | given the sample in terms of organization is | 15 | about the selection of comparator groups. |
| 16 | 390 , and 390 is not jobs. It's the number | 16 | Can we go please to RFI PUB-NP No. 171? Mr. |
| 17 | of companies. And 390 companies, each of | 17 | Ma , this was a series of questions from the |
| 18 | the companies has got multiple jobs. So, we | 18 | Board related to comparator group, and I |
| 19 | are talking about, if it is times five, it | 19 | want to bring you down to your answer to |
| 20 | is quite a big sample in terms of the number | 20 | question number one. So, we can scroll down |
| 21 | of incumbents in compiling the statistical | 21 | a little please. I see the system is making |
| 22 | analysis. | 22 | us wait this morning. Good, right there is |
| 23 | SIMMONS, KC: | 23 | good. Okay. So, in question number one, |
| 24 | Q. Um-hm. So, in presenting your market data | 24 | and you start out saying, "the comparator |
| 25 | for Newfoundland Power, you've described for | 25 | group is a broad selection of Canadian - of |
|  | Page 78 |  | Page 80 |
| 1 | us what the comparator group was composed | 1 | commercial industrial organizations", which |
| 2 | of, what sort of companies are in there, and | 2 | you've described to us, on a national level, |
| 3 | you haven't tried, I gather, to construct a | 3 | and then it says, "in discussion with |
| 4 | comparator group, a smaller comparator group | 4 | Newfoundland Power, the selection criteria |
| 5 | maybe, that's composed of utilities? | 5 | was originally recommended by Korn Ferry, |
| 6 | R. MA: | 6 | then the Hay Group, in 1997, approved by the |
| 7 | A. We did not. | 7 | Board of Directors beginning in '98 and has |
| 8 | SIMMONS, KC: | 8 | been used continuously since that time." |
| 9 | Q. Yeah, okay. And I presume you did no kind | 9 | So, my first question is: would Korn Ferry |
| 10 | of statistical analysis to determine whether | 10 | use any comparator group that was not |
| 11 | it would be possible to construct a | 11 | approved by the Board of Directors of |
| 12 | comparator group like that that would give | 12 | Newfoundland Power? |
| 13 | you some reliable or useful results. You | 13 | MR. MA: |
| 14 | exercised your judgment that there would not | 14 | A. No. |
| 15 | be enough to do it? | 15 | SIMMONS, KC: |
| 16 | MR. MA: | 16 | Q. And has there been any change in the |
| 17 | A. I think, you know, the first test is how | 17 | comparator group since the first |
| 18 | many private sector utilities is available | 18 | recommendation in 1997? |
| 19 | to us. So, we came to conclusions that | 19 | MR. MA: |
| 20 | there are too few to conduct that type of | 20 | A. The selection principle has not changed |
| 21 | analysis as far as we are concerned. | 21 | after periodic validations with Newfoundland |
| 22 | SIMMONS, KC: | 22 | Power. |
| 23 | Q. The survey data is drawn from clients of | 23 | SIMMONS, KC: |
| 24 | Korn Ferry and I gather there are | 24 | Q. Yeah. |
| 25 | confidentiality agreements with clients that | 25 | MR. MA: |



| Page 85 |  | sure I understand it correctly. |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | who are, might be employing capital |  |  |  |  |
| 2 | projects, the kind of organizations to | 2 | MR. MA: |  |  |
| 3 | represent some of those business lines of | 3 | A. | For illustration purpose, I have worked with |  |
| 4 | Newfoundland Power, for example. But these | 4 |  | another utility or | rget |
| 5 | are all already included in the broad | 5 |  | comparator gro |  |
| 6 | comparator group already. It's just a | 6 |  | organizations on | over |
| 7 | matter of focusing certain types of segment | 7 |  | between privat |  |
| 8 | of the comparator group for reasonable | 8 |  | something that | ould |
| 9 | check. | 9 |  | like to see the out |  |
| 10 | SIMMONS, KC: | 10 |  | other hand, like | or some |
| 11 | Q. Okay. Do you think now that it would be a | 11 |  | other organiza |  |
| 12 | worthwhile exercise to conduct a review of | 12 |  | commercial/in | up as a |
| 13 | alternative comparator groups to see if | 13 |  | broad market, | cipants |
| 14 | there's one that would turn out to be more | 14 |  | are included in | without |
| 15 | appropriate for the circumstances of | 15 |  | any kind of seg |  |
| 16 | Newfoundland Power? | 16 |  | selection criter |  |
| 17 | MR. MA: | 17 |  | criteria. So, th |  |
| 18 | A. I cannot answer that question immediately. | 18 |  | been adopted by |  |
| 19 | I think that might be a topic for further | 19 |  | reasons and th |  |
| 20 | exploration. | 20 |  | answers. |  |
| 21 | SIMMONS, KC: | 21 |  | ONS, KC: |  |
| 22 | Q. And am I right that ultimately it would the | 22 | Q. | So, does Korn | king |
| 23 | decision of the Board of Newfoundland Power | 23 |  | recommendatio | what it |
| 24 | whether A) to undertake a review like that, | 24 |  | he most approp | or group |
| 25 | and B) whether to adopt a change in the | 25 |  | or is that some |  |
|  | Page 86 |  |  |  | Page 88 |
| 1 | criteria for the comparator group? | 1 |  | instruction as |  |
| 2 | MR. MA: | 2 |  | approach dete | group. |
| 3 | A. That could be a consideration. That will | 3 |  | MA: |  |
| 4 | probably be a good governance process. At | 4 | A | I think it's bo |  |
| 5 | the end of the day, the board of directors | 5 |  | MONS, KC: |  |
| 6 | is ultimately responsible for that decision. | 6 | Q | Um-hm. |  |
| 7 | (10:45 a.m.) | 7 |  | MA: |  |
| 8 | SIMMONS, KC: | 8 | A. | Sometimes it |  |
| 9 | Q. Okay. Now, you've already been taken to | 9 |  | organizations | nitiated |
| 10 | PUB-NP-173 which lists what some of the | 10 |  | by Korn Ferry | process. |
| 11 | local or electrical utility, Atlantic | 11 |  | MONS, KC: |  |
| 12 | Canadian organizations are. So, I won't go | 12 | Q. | In your comp | lection |
| 13 | there now with you, but I will take you to | 13 |  | of it, obvious | public |
| 14 | PUB-NP-176 please. And in the answer to | 14 |  | utilities in the | m are |
| 15 | question number 1, in the second paragraph, | 15 |  | other types of |  |
| 16 | "utility organizations may use a target | 16 |  | enterprises. | d you to |
| 17 | comparator group or a broad market group | 17 |  | say that publi | ve been |
| 18 | depending on their own size, type of | 18 |  | deliberately ex | parator |
| 19 | services, service jurisdiction, ownership | 19 |  | group? |  |
| 20 | structure, et cetera. There's no single | 20 |  | MA: |  |
| 21 | approach to building the appropriate | 21 | A. | Public sector. |  |
| 22 | comparator group". Can you explain to me | 22 |  | MONS, KC: |  |
| 23 | what the difference would be between a | 23 | Q. | Public sector. |  |
| 24 | target comparator group and a broad market | 24 |  | MAY: |  |
| 25 | group? I may know, but I just like to make | 25 | Q. | Yeah. |  |



|  | Page 93 |  | wouldn't the executive officers of public 95 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | A. That's right. | 1 |  |  |
| 2 | SIMMONS, KC: | 2 |  | sector public utilities have all those same |
| 3 | Q. So, Korn Ferry goes have the ability to make | 3 |  | objectives and concerns? |
| 4 | the comparison or include public sector | 4 |  |  |
| 5 | utility compensation in the database, | 5 | A | Yes, I do. It's just a matter of the public |
| 6 | correct? | 6 |  | sector organizations they have got another |
| 7 | MR. MA: | 7 |  | layer there which is different from a |
| 8 | A. I would believe so. The big public sector | 8 |  | private sector organization. It's the |
| 9 | utility companies, we have got quite a | 9 |  | ownerships, and that ownership will call for |
| 10 | number of them, because they are the | 10 |  | different types of compensations, |
| 11 | characteristics in Canada. | 11 |  | interventions and support and strategies. |
| 12 | SIMMONS, KC: | 12 |  | MONS, KC: |
| 13 | Q. But you can see I'm having some trouble with | 13 | Q. | Okay. Thank you. |
| 14 | excluding them because of some specific | 14 |  |  |
| 15 | characteristics when on the other hand you | 15 | A. | And one more thing. I want to supplement |
| 16 | say you don't apply those kinds of similar | 16 |  | that. Public sector organizations have |
| 17 | considerations to all these other companies | 17 |  | access to the capital backed up by the |
| 18 | that are in your-in your | 18 |  | governments while the private sector |
| 19 | commercial/industrial group. | 19 |  | organizations do not. |
| 20 | MR. MA: | 20 |  | MONS, KC: |
| 21 | A. Can you repeat your concern again? | 21 | Q. | PUB-NP-172, please. Now, this question I |
| 22 | SIMMONS, KC: | 22 |  | don't think is specific to public sector |
| 23 | Q. Yes. I'm still having trouble understanding | 23 |  | utilities, but you do refer to-in the answer |
| 24 | why you consider it appropriate to | 24 |  | you say, "It would also be appropriate to |
| 25 | distinguish the public sector utilities | 25 |  | include Canada electrical utilities sector |
|  | Page 94 |  |  | Page 96 |
| 1 | because the executives are paid differently | 1 |  | organizations that share a common operating |
| 2 | when you don't apply differentiating factors | 2 |  | and regulatory environment for evaluating |
| 3 | like that to all the other companies in your | 3 |  | Newfoundland Power's executive |
| 4 | broad commercial/industrial group. What | 4 |  | compensation." And your end conclusion is |
| 5 | would be the harm in including them in the | 5 |  | that Korn Ferry's database does not have |
| 6 | group? | 6 |  | enough comparable utility organizations from |
| 7 | MR. MA: | 7 |  | the private sector to conduct a full |
| 8 | A. The other comparator organization in the | 8 |  | analysis. So, just to reiterate, leaving |
| 9 | commercial/industrial organizations, they | 9 |  | aside public sector utility organizations, a |
| 10 | are all sharing one thing common with | 10 |  | comparison to private sector utility |
| 11 | Newfoundland Power, is they are all private | 11 |  | organizations would be a useful comparison |
| 12 | sector organizations. | 12 |  | to do, but Korn Ferry just doesn't have the |
| 13 | SIMMONS, KC: | 13 |  | data you say to be able to do it? |
| 14 | Q. Right. | 14 |  |  |
| 15 | MR. MA: | 15 | A. | That's true. |
| 16 | A. And I do not discriminate anything at all. | 16 |  | ONS, KC: |
| 17 | They are all having an orientations of | 17 | Q. | Okay. I had a question for you about, and |
| 18 | client services, to a certain degree | 18 |  | this is something we heard about from an |
| 19 | efficiencies and operations excellence, | 19 |  | earlier witness, from the Chief Financial |
| 20 | adequate amount of earnings to pay back the | 20 |  | Officer, Ms. London, who I think you deal |
| 21 | shareholders. All these are shared common | 21 |  | with, and we understand that Newfoundland |
| 22 | business models across all these 390 | 22 |  | Power uses one of your competitors, Willis |
| 23 | organizations. | 23 |  | Towers Watson, for the evaluation of |
| 24 | SIMMONS, KC: | 24 |  | compensation for their management group. |
| 25 | Q. And I'll leave this topic in a moment, but | 25 |  | And we understand that Willis Towers Watson, |


|  | Page 97 | Page 99 |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | from what Ms. London told us, uses a | 1 |  | ONS, KC: |
| 2 | comparator group that's about half and half, | 2 | Q. | If we can go to your report, please, at page |
| 3 | general industry and half energy and | 3 |  | 6. I think it's PDF page 7. Just see where |
| 4 | utility, and that's there's a couple of | 4 |  | we are. |
| 5 | dozen energy and utility companies in the | 5 |  | LYNN: |
| 6 | group. Some of those are companies like BC | 6 | Q. | Mr. Simmons, I do note that it's 11:00. Are |
| 7 | Hydro, and Hydro One, and Hydro Quebec, that | 7 |  | you close to finishing? |
| 8 | are in fact public sector organizations. | 8 |  | ONS, KC: |
| 9 | MR. MA: | 9 |  | I'd probably need about another 10 minutes, |
| 10 | A. Um-hm. | 10 |  | maybe 15 . So, we can certainly take a break |
| 11 | SIMMONS, KC: | 11 |  | now and pick it up after the break. |
| 12 | Q. So, does Korn Ferry have that data available | 12 |  |  |
| 13 | from those, generally from those same | 13 | Q. | We'll take a break now then. Thank you. |
| 14 | sources? | 14 |  | (BREAK - 11:02 a.m.) |
| 15 | MR. MA: | 15 |  | (RESUME 11:32 A.M.) |
| 16 | A. I do not have access to that list, but I | 16 |  |  |
| 17 | think our database has got, you know, the | 17 |  | Welcome back. Back to you, Mr. Simmons. |
| 18 | big utility organizations data, you know, | 18 |  | ONS, KC: |
| 19 | for management positions too. I can say it | 19 | Q. | Okay, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ma, we |
| 20 | with confidence that for management | 20 |  | have on the screen now page 7 from our |
| 21 | positions, executive like finance managers, | 21 |  | report. I think I've asked for page 6, |
| 22 | or IT managers, you know, that's a lot of | 22 |  | previously, and I apologize because I have |
| 23 | mobilities, potential opportunities to move | 23 |  | my numbers down wrong. And this is where |
| 24 | between private sector and public sector | 24 |  | under . 4 Methodology you give two reasons |
| 25 | organizations in the utility sectors. You | 25 |  | for Korn Ferry's belief that it is |
|  | Page 98 |  |  | Page 100 |
| 1 | know, engineer managers are engineer | 1 |  | reasonable to use the list of comparable |
| 2 | managers. So, with that type of pattern of | 2 |  | organizations that were used here. The |
| 3 | talent mobility it would be appropriate to | 3 |  | first one refers to the, I guess the idea |
| 4 | include, you know, both or combined broader | 4 |  | that there's some objectivity with the point |
| 5 | public sector utility companies with private | 5 |  | adjusted basis that you described earlier. |
| 6 | sector utility companies. So, the nature | 6 |  | The second one says that, in part, latter |
| 7 | and the background of the talent landscape | 7 |  | part, that Newfoundland Power competes for |
| 8 | for the managers' roles are different from | 8 |  | its executive resources with organizations |
| 9 | the executive roles. | 9 |  | across the breadth and depth of business |
| 10 | (11:00 a.m.) | 10 |  | sectors across Canada, and we talked about |
| 11 | SIMMONS, KC: | 11 |  | that a bit already, but am I correct in |
| 12 | Q. Okay. And Willis Tower appears to have | 12 |  | understanding that this is an assumption |
| 13 | enough data from utilities, I guess private | 13 |  | that underlines the choice of comparator |
| 14 | and public, to be able to have a comparator | 14 |  | group? |
| 15 | group that's outweighed at 50 percent in | 15 |  | A |
| 16 | that area. From the database that Korn | 16 | A. | This is not an assumption, this is the fact |
| 17 | Ferry has, would you be able to construct a | 17 |  | that we adopted, that contributes to the |
| 18 | similar comparator group for Newfoundland | 18 |  | list of organizations in Appendix C are |
| 19 | Power executives that has a similar heavier | 19 |  | reasonable in terms of the usage for setting |
| 20 | weighting on utility positions compared to | 20 |  | executive compensation policies for |
| 21 | the one that you're using now? | 21 |  | Newfoundland Power. |
| 22 | MR. MA: | 22 |  | ONS, KC: |
| 23 | A. I cannot directly answer your question with | 23 | Q. | What is the basis for your statement that |
| 24 | confidence without looking at the database | 24 |  | "it is a fact that Newfoundland Power |
| 25 | first. | 25 |  | competes for its executive resources with |





|  | Page 113 |  | Page 115 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | upon that kind of agreement, we proceeded | 1 | Q. | I understood from - and we can go there - |
| 2 | with the analysis. | 2 |  | PUB-NP-171, as well as your answer to Mr. |
| 3 | GREENE, KC: | 3 |  | Simmons this morning, that in 2023, Korn |
| 4 | Q. So then to clarify, it was management that | 4 |  | Ferry also undertook a review of the |
| 5 | asked you to do the review? | 5 |  | appropriateness of the peer group. If we |
| 6 | MR. MA: | 6 |  | could scroll down, the number two, we see, |
| 7 | A. We engaged, management engaged us with the | 7 |  | "the last review of the selection criteria |
| 8 | review. That was our contact point. We | 8 |  | and the list of organizations was in 2023". |
| 9 | knew that, you know, all the review, the | 9 |  | That's the review I'm talking about with you |
| 10 | information will be provided to the board of | 10 |  | right now. |
| 11 | directors. | 11 |  | MA: |
| 12 | GREENE, KC: | 12 | A. | Yes, that was the selection criteria before |
| 13 | Q. And in doing the review, what was the extent | 13 |  | we completed the salary letter. |
| 14 | of the review that was completed? | 14 |  | NE, KC: |
| 15 | MR. MA: | 15 |  | Okay. And how often do you do that review? |
| 16 | A. Are you talking about the year 2024 report? | 16 |  |  |
| 17 | GREENE, KC: | 17 | A. | I do not have a particular answer, you know. |
| 18 | Q. No, I understood you said that in 2023 there | 18 |  | I think it is on a need basis. |
| 19 | was a review undertaken of the continued | 19 |  | NE, KC: |
| 20 | appropriateness of the comparator group that | 20 | Q. | And I wanted to know the extent of the |
| 21 | is used. | 21 |  | review. What work did you do to satisfy |
| 22 | MR. MA: | 22 |  | yourself that the commercial industrial |
| 23 | A. Right. | 23 |  | group was still the appropriate peer group |
| 24 | GREENE, KC: | 24 |  | for Newfoundland Power? |
| 25 | Q. So that's the review I'm talking about. | 25 |  | MA: |
|  | Page 114 |  |  | Page 116 |
| 1 | MR. MA: | 1 | A. | To the extent that we ask the questions, we |
| 2 | A. Okay, so that will definitely, that review- | 2 |  | are most likely ensuring certain types of, |
| 3 | there are two reviews, in the year 2023 the | 3 |  | you know, principles is satisfied during the |
| 4 | first review was the compensation or salary | 4 |  | review process, whether it is representing |
| 5 | letter issued in early 2023. | 5 |  | the total market is still valid, you know. |
| 6 | GREENE, KC: | 6 |  | We did not conduct the analysis based upon |
| 7 | Q. And the salary letter that you referred to | 7 |  | recent experience, you know, within |
| 8 | with Mr. Simmons, that's the annual letter | 8 |  | Newfoundland Power whether the CEO is coming |
| 9 | where you give information as to what the | 9 |  | from within Fortis or not. We did not do |
| 10 | expected baseline salary adjustment will be | 10 |  | that type of analysis. |
| 11 | for executives for next year, is that right? | 11 |  | NE, KC: |
| 12 | MR. MA: | 12 | Q. | Did you do any type of analysis that would |
| 13 | A. That's right. The second review is not | 13 |  | have looked at the salary ranges for the |
| 14 | about compensation, it's about job | 14 |  | points that Newfoundland Power executives |
| 15 | evaluations done in 2023. | 15 |  | have in comparison to the salaries paid by |
| 16 | GREENE, KC: | 16 |  | any other group of companies, nationally, in |
| 17 | Q. Yes, so that is where you looked at the Hay | 17 |  | Atlantic Canada or in Newfoundland? |
| 18 | points assigned for each position to see if | 18 |  |  |
| 19 | the Hay points were appropriately assigned | 19 | A. | We did not do any direct comparisons between |
| 20 | in light of the change in the | 20 |  | Newfoundland Power and other Fortis groups |
| 21 | responsibilities for each of the members of | 21 |  | of company. We did not. |
| 22 | the executive, is that correct? | 22 |  | NE, KC: |
| 23 | MR. MA: | 23 | Q. | Did you submit a memo, a report or anything |
| 24 | A. Correct. | 24 |  | in writing explaining the review that you |
| 25 | GREENE, KC: | 25 |  | had undertaken, the analysis and the results |



|  | Page 121 <br> in your selection of companies, the |  |  |  | Page 123 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 |  |  |  | but they certainly have the | come |
| 2 | difference in the nature of a regulated | 2 |  | to a regulator and to ensure |  |
| 3 | MR. MA: | 3 |  | costs are recovered and that | o earn |
| 4 |  | 4 |  | a profit. |  |
| 5 | We did not particularly consider the risk factor because every organization encounter different levels and profile risks | 5 |  | MA: |  |
| 6 |  | 6 | A | Probably very few of them | ll these |
| 7 |  | 7 |  | private sector companies, I |  |
| 8 | differently. We assume one thing is private sector organizations, all of them are | 8 |  | majority is not regulated. H | many of |
| 9 |  | 9 |  | them are subject to regulatio |  |
| 10 | sharing a limitations of capitals and that is a true statement that I can confidently | 10 |  | security loss and other kind |  |
| 11 |  | 11 |  | ENE, KC: |  |
| 12 | reflect that all of the executive in a | 12 | Q | But not with respect to thei | y of |
| 13 | private sector organization need to think | 13 |  | profit? |  |
| 14 | about how to balance and produce certain degrees of profits to make a good return or | 14 |  | MA: |  |
| 15 |  | 15 | A | That's right. |  |
| 16 | acceptable returns to the shareholders. In | 16 |  | EENE, KC: |  |
| 17 | our own thinking during the process, board | 17 |  | Or the recovery of costs. |  |
| 18 | of public sector organizations are also | 18 |  | , MA: |  |
| 19 | asked, you know, to provide good services, operation excellence, that kind of thing. | 19 | A. | Yeah. |  |
| 20 |  | 20 |  | ENE, KC: |  |
| 21 | But the only difference is the access of capital. And most of the times when we are | 21 | Q | And how does that environm |  |
| 22 |  | 22 |  | monopoly or the regulated | ment of a |
| 23 | looking at regulated business, regulated | 23 |  | public utility affect the eva |  |
| 24 | business, you have a license, monopoly | 24 |  | points when you look at the | solving |
| 25 | license, quote/unquote, to conduct business, | 25 |  | and the accountability? Is |  |
|  | Page 122 |  |  |  | Page 124 |
| 1 | but on the other hand, you are not having a | 1 |  | you take into account when Hay points are |  |
| 2 | mandate to maximize the profits because of | 2 |  | assigned for those types of factors? |  |
| 3 | the regulators and other kinds of | 3 | MR. |  |  |
| 4 | restrictions. So, you are being asked to | 4 |  | Yes, to a certain extent. If it is |  |
| 5 | run your own operations efficiently, with | 5 |  | regulated, to a certain extent. Part of the |  |
| 6 | good cost management and reflecting or | 6 |  | considerations is the knowhow that you have |  |
| 7 | delivering the good services to your | 7 |  | to deal with compliance, for example, and |  |
| 8 | customers. So, this kind of basis concepts | 8 |  | that is already considered in the knowhow |  |
| 9 | with respect to the private sector | 9 |  | assignments of the points in the knowhow. |  |
| 10 | organizations, they may not have the | 10 |  | NE, KC: |  |
| 11 | license, the monopoly, but on the other | 11 | Q. | Those are all the questions that I have, Mr . |  |
| 12 | hand, they are doing that as a result of | 12 |  | Chair. |  |
| 13 | market competitions to force them to be | 13 | CHA | MAN: |  |
| 14 | competitive running operation excellence and | 14 |  | Thank you. Any questions? |  |
| 15 | good quality of service or products. It's | 15 | COM | IISSIONER NEWMAN: |  |
| 16 | just a matter that the background are | 16 | Q. | No questions. |  |
| 17 | different, but the means of achieve that and | 17 | COM | MISSIONER O'BRIEN: |  |
| 18 | the objective to achieve that are the same | 18 |  | No questions for me. |  |
| 19 | between Newfoundland Power and the private | 19 |  | ICLIF MA, CROSS-EXAMINATION BY | AN KEVIN |
| 20 | sector organizations. | 20 |  |  |  |
| 21 | :00 p.m.) | 21 | CHA | RMAN: |  |
| 22 | GREENE, KC: | 22 | Q. | I've got just a couple. If we could put the |  |
| 23 | Q. So, in the companies that you have in your | 23 |  | appendix back up that was just there for a |  |
| 24 | group, the peer group, how many others would | 24 |  | moment? Yeah. There's been a lot of |  |
| 25 | have that ability to - it's not a guarantee, | 25 |  | questions with respect to your comparative |  |


|  | Page 125 |  | Page 127 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | group and whether you could break it down by | 1 | levels declined or even stopped growing over |
| 2 | including utilities and public sector and | 2 | the period of the pandemic. Is that fair? |
| 3 | the like, and stuff like that, but I just | 3 | MR. MA: |
| 4 | want to look - just looking at the P-75, P- | 4 | A. I think the compensation level at |
| 5 | 50 and P-25 for the different positions. I | 5 | Newfoundland Power did not decrease. That's |
| 6 | was wondering your opinion. There's a | 6 | a true statement. |
| 7 | couple different ways to go about it, but | 7 | CHAIRMAN: |
| 8 | without doing the full sample data, but | 8 | Q. I think - I won't go there, but there's - I |
| 9 | thinking about if you include public sector | 9 | think if we look at the data, I think that |
| 10 | organizations and utilities in your math, do | 10 | it's been consistently growing somewhat. |
| 11 | you think it would be more likely that the | 11 | The next one though, "minor increases in |
| 12 | target total remuneration would be closer to | 12 | short-term incentive opportunities over that |
| 13 | the P-25 rows in the table, where there's - | 13 | period". Now, I was looking at I think it's |
| 14 | like in P-50 for the president, about 1.3 | 14 | - it might have been PUB-131, and it was |
| 15 | million. P-25 is around three-quarters of a | 15 | showing the salary increases for the |
| 16 | million. Vice-president and CFO about 669, | 16 | Newfoundland Power executives and you |
| 17 | down to about 427, and similarly on down. | 17 | provided a recommendation of the salary, I |
| 18 | Just what are your thoughts on that? | 18 | guess, of what's going on in the market to |
| 19 | MR. MA: | 19 | the Board of Directors each year. So, I was |
| 20 | A. I do not know because I haven't done the | 20 | looking at the data over the last two years |
| 21 | analysis. I wouldn't speculate on the | 21 | and it was indicating that the increases for |
| 22 | outcome, whether it would be a P-25 or P-30 | 22 | the executive at Newfoundland Power are |
| 23 | or P-40. Without doing an analysis, I would | 23 | exactly the same percentages as the |
| 24 | not be able to answer your question | 24 | increases for the union at Newfoundland |
| 25 | directly, Mr. Chair. | 25 | Power. So, I was thinking that that seems |
|  | Page 126 |  | Page 128 |
| 1 | CHAIRMAN: | 1 | just a bit odd. If there's market |
| 2 | Q. Okay. Would you think it would be generally | 2 | information coming to the Board of |
| 3 | lower though than - | 3 | Directors, it certainly wouldn't appear to |
| 4 | MR. MA: | 4 | be coincidence that they're exactly the same |
| 5 | A. I would expect generally it would be lower | 5 | percentage. So, I was trying to get a bit |
| 6 | slightly, but I also believe that it depends | 6 | of an understanding on that aspect of it. |
| 7 | on what types of public sector organizations | 7 | But it seemed to me that if you're in an |
| 8 | you are considering. | 8 | economy where times are tough and cost |
| 9 | CHAIRMAN: | 9 | challenges and stuff like that that you |
| 10 | Q. Okay, thank you. Just wonder if you could | 10 | think the executive would be willing to take |
| 11 | go to the summary page in your evidence. I | 11 | maybe less of a base increase and more on |
| 12 | was trying to understand one particular | 12 | the risk side, more on incentive pay; that |
| 13 | item. Just move on down to - there's a list | 13 | if they do well during the tough times, they |
| 14 | of items on the next page, I think. Yes, | 14 | get more STI, but not necessarily take it on |
| 15 | here. Down a little bit further, please. | 15 | the base pay. But in Newfoundland Power's |
| 16 | Maybe it's the next page. Yeah, here, yeah. | 16 | case, the executive are getting the same |
| 17 | Down a bit further, please. Okay, yeah, | 17 | increases as the union employees, which |
| 18 | that's it. Thank you. The last three | 18 | based on the math that I saw, that also |
| 19 | bullets, minus signs, so "compared to the | 19 | impacts the STI because STI is a percentage |
| 20 | last review in 2021, compensation levels for | 20 | of their salary. So, do you think it's - is |
| 21 | the comparator market have rebounded | 21 | that a good incentive to the executive for |
| 22 | sharply, post pandemic, surpassing the | 22 | them to get the same increases as the union |
| 23 | levels in 2018 generally." Now, for | 23 | people, but also have their STI increase at |
| 24 | Newfoundland Power, was there any - there's | 24 | that same percentage? |
| 25 | no evidence here, I think, that compensation | 25 | MR. MA: |




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